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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique

[criticisms of the functionalist theory of mind]

18 ideas
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau]
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey]
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]