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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection

[learning about our minds by looking inwards]

15 ideas
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: As the word is normally used, it can't be said of me at all that I 'know' I am in pain; what is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain?
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §246)
     A reaction: This raises the question of whether self-consciousness implies self-knowledge, and suggests that it doesn't. All our normal talk of knowledge requires some sort of reliable justification of beliefs, and we can't drop that in the case of self-knowledge.
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection
     A reaction: I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible).
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395)
     A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them.
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396)
     A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible.
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
     Full Idea: On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)
     A reaction: This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions.
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
     Full Idea: The 'problem' of introspection evaporates once one understands that it is not a process in which one looks inward.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)
     A reaction: I take it that when we introspect we look at the contents of thoughts, which are representations of the external world, on the whole. But surely only the connections of those contents with memories can be seen inwardly?
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Introspection has no phenomenology or, if it does, it always has the same phenomenology as the experience one is introspecting.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.4)
     A reaction: There is a difference between looking at a tree, and being aware of yourself looking at a tree. You can be faintly depressed, and then become aware that you are faintly depressed. He is nearly right.
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
     Full Idea: We have the visual metaphor of introspection, and the spatial metaphor of privileged access, but neither one works because I am the thing being viewed, and I am the space being entered.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.II)
     A reaction: This is quite a good warning against reliance on analogies when dealing with the unique problem of self-knowledge, though the phrase 'hall-of-mirrors' draws assent from most people concerning that topic.
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
     Full Idea: If by "introspection" we mean simply thinking about our own mental states, then there is no objection to introspection, but if we mean a special capacity like vision of looking inwards, there is no such capacity.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6.II.2)
     A reaction: This seems to beg the question of how we can be aware of our mental states in order to think about them. One might image that some animals have mental states, but are quite unaware that they have them, because they are totally focused on content.
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
     Full Idea: Externalism about content would have the consequence that most of our knowledge of our own intentional states is indirect and must be based on external evidence.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.207)
     A reaction: I think this is a confusion, endemic in discussions of externalism. If what Shakespeare meant by 'water' is H2O, or Putnam means by 'elm' what experts say, the point is that their meanings are NOT part of their intentional states, which are bookmarks.
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: I am inclined to think that all conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006])
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very helpful suggestion, for eliminating lots of problem cases for introspective knowledge which have been triumphally paraded in recent times. It might, though, be tautological, if it is actually a definition of 'conscious states'.
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it.
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: I am suggesting that introspective psychology might have a contribution to make to fundamental physics.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.176)
     A reaction: I'm a fan of introspection, as a source of genuine information.
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
     Full Idea: Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
     From: David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
     A reaction: This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
     Full Idea: Our knowledge of our thoughts includes both our knowledge that we think and our knowledge of the contents of our thought.
     From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §I)
     A reaction: This seems like a simple, self-evident and true distinction. We might question the first part, though. Knowledge involves the contents, but the fact that we think may be an inference from the contents, or even a fictional abstraction. Contents alone?