| 5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
| 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
| 3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
| 9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
| 2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
| 5692 | Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal] |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |