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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection

[learning about our minds by looking inwards]

15 ideas
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]