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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection

[learning about our minds by looking inwards]

26 ideas
Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte]
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Shoemaker on Armstrong]
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Shoemaker]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey]
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey]
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil]
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]