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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking

[how particulars are said to relate to Forms]

21 ideas
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]