| 304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
| 24282 | A form is wholly present in many different things (just as a day is present in many places) [Plato] |
| 212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
| 213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
| 24288 | Probably partaking in the Forms is like being modeled on a pattern [Plato] |
| 215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
| 24283 | It is most likely that forms are patterns, and a thing partakes by being modelled on the form [Plato] |
| 216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
| 218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
| 1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
| 24227 | One and one can only become two by sharing in Twoness [Plato] |
| 368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
| 4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
| 24228 | Believers in the beautiful see that it is separate from things that participate in it [Plato] |
| 17 | A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato] |
| 24285 | Beauty itself is eternal, and beautiful objects partake of it, but never change it [Plato] |
| 317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
| 556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
| 16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
| 633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
| 643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
| 647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
| 6900 | A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway] |
| 7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |