structure for 'Knowledge Criteria'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism

[knowledge is entirely 'down to the individual']

21 ideas
Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus]
     Full Idea: Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger makes satisfaction good, weariness makes rest good.
     From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B111), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.178
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
     Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes
     From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3
If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
     Full Idea: Because the wind is cold to me but not you, Protagoras takes it to in itself neither cold nor not-cold. Accordingly, I very much doubt that he can allow the wind to be exactly as cold as itself.
     From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8
You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
     Full Idea: Only if the thing that is cold to me is precisely identical with the thing that is not cold to you can Protagoras launch his argument, but then it is seen to be the thing in itself that exists absolutely speaking.
     From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The claim that all appearances are true makes all things relational. Hence the claim is shifted to all appearances being true relative to a subject, time, sense and context.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a20)
     A reaction: applies to Epicurus
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If things are true relative to an individual, how can something seem honey to the sight but not to the taste, or, given that we have two eyes, things may not seem the same to the sight of both of them.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a24)
That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
     Full Idea: That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so.
     From: Timon (On Sensations (frags) [c.285 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.104-5
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101)
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103)
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109)
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80)
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96)
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.158)
     A reaction: A nice clear example of how some relativism must be acknowledged. It feels hot, but what is its temperature in degrees C?
Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is [Goethe]
     Full Idea: Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is.
     From: Wolfgang von Goethe (Maxims and Reflections [1825], 203)
     A reaction: Nice. It is true, even when it is pointed out to us. No matter how hard we try to realise how very different animals are from us, we can't help identifying with them. Religious people even do it with inanimate creation.
Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche recommends an extreme version of perspectivism in holding that a person's view of the world is a function of that person's life-affirming (Heraclitean) or life-denying (Parmenidean) personality.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3
     A reaction: Fogelin recommends Nehamas on this topic. I am not convinced Nietzsche takes such an individual view as is implied here. See Idea 4420, for example. This view is in tune with Charles Taylor's view that our values shape our understanding of our selves.
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'Comprehending everything' - that would mean abolishing all perspectival relations, that would mean comprehending nothing, mistaking the nature of the knower.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 01[114])
     A reaction: The point here, I take it, is not just that there is too much to comprehend, but that comprehending is partly a subjective matter. Personally I am drawn to the opposite pole, expressed by Spinoza (Idea 4840).
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Fundamental question: whether the perspectival is part of the essence, and not just a form of regarding, a relation between various beings?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 05[12])
     A reaction: I don't personally understand how the perspectival could be part of the essence of anything. If everything is perspectival, then perspectives are limits, and essences are unknowable. It seems to me that we have learned a lot about essences.
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'Everything is subjective', you say: but that itself is an interpretation, for the 'subject' is not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind. Even the interpreter behind the interpretation is a fiction, hypothesis.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 07[60])
     A reaction: How glorious to even suggest that the subjective account of knowledge is making too many assumptions! If modern students of philosophy were to meet Nietzsche, they would be reduced to the response of Cratylus (Idea 578).
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Inasmuch as the word 'knowledge' has any meaning at all, the world is knowable: but it is variously interpretable; it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. 'Perspectivism'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 07[60])
     A reaction: This account sounds like Humean 'projectivism', espoused by Simon Blackburn - meanings are projected onto a meaningless world. If nearly all of our perspectives agreed, might that not be because they were all true?
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There are many different eyes, .... and consequently there are many different 'truths', and consequently there is no truth.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 34[230])
     A reaction: Sorry, I just don't follow this. Most people see the same things with their eyes, even if the perspective is subtly different. If we are puzzled by what we see, we swap places to check it. Nietzsche's life was too solitary. Some 'truths' are wrong.
'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
     Full Idea: What is called 'subjectivism' is really just an extension of relativism from the level of the social group to the level of the individual.
     From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Personally I prefer to stick with 'relativism', at any level. 'Relative' is a two-place predicate, so we should always specify what is relative to what, unless it is obvious from context. Morality might be relative to God, for example.