| 22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
| 199 | The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates] |
| 1653 | Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5843 | People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5253 | Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates] |
| 195 | No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates] |
| 24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
| 23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
| 20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 22098 | Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
| 7209 | There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche] |
| 23878 | Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil] |
| 6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
| 4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
| 23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
| 4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
| 23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |