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22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value

[distinction between what is and what ought to be]

15 ideas
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume]
Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C]
The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume]
You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume]
We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant]
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
Facts don't oppose values; they are integrated into each person's aspirations [Gadamer, by Zimmermann,J]
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
Systems that generate a sense of value are basic to the primitive brain [Edelman/Tononi]
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]