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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

[seeing rules for action as universal guidelines]

22 ideas
Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi]
     Full Idea: It is those who are partial in their dealings with others who are the real cause of all the great harms in the world. That is why our teacher Mozi says 'I condemn partiality'.
     From: Mozi (The Mozi [c.440 BCE], 16), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 4.II
     A reaction: This is morality as the rule of law, rather than as the result of human affections. He is on the same wavelength as Kant. Mozi was criticising Confucius, who favoured family over strangers.
Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi]
     Full Idea: Even though one may not advocate impartiality, one would certainly want to entrust one's family to the person who is impartial.
     From: Mozi (The Mozi [c.440 BCE], 16), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 4.II
     A reaction: In the modern world his example would be the police, so he effectively he wants the impartiality of the law. But who wants legal impartiality within the affairs of a family?
The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero]
     Full Idea: The whole essence of propriety is quite certainly consistency.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.110)
     A reaction: This seems to me the key intuition on which Kant built his deontological ethical theory. However, opponents say the consistency requires principles, and these are the enemies of truly good human behaviour, which involves Aristotle's 'particulars'.
Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Men who are governed by reason - that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason - desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and so are just, faithful and honourable in their conduct.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 18)
     A reaction: This is pulling a rather Kantian rabbit out of a very social contract hat. It chimes in with Aristotle's account of self-interest, which leads to good civic virtues. True Kantianism is self-abnegating, but Spinoza lets selfishness take the lead.
A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: He who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 51)
     A reaction: Obviously a very Kantian idea. It implies that all rational people desire similar goods, but it is rational to collect stamps but not want other people to do so as well. I don't think you should want what I want for Christmas.
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
     Full Idea: With sufficient ingenuity, almost every precept can be consistently universalized.
     From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14
     A reaction: A concise statement of J.S.Mill's point (Idea 3762). The point is that Kant seems to allow burglary, as long as you don't complain when you are burgled. What sort of maxim would a suicidal mass murderer being willing to universalize?
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
     Full Idea: If my maxim is 'augment my property by all safe means', I can't make that a law allowing me to keep a dead man's loan, because no one would make a loan if that were the moral law.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§4)
     A reaction: This is a simple illustration of Kant's strategy and it shows clearly how, for all his talk of 'pure reason', his moral law is strongly guided by consequences, and that these can only judged by prior values - for example, that loans are a good thing.
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
     Full Idea: The form of universality is itself the determining ground of the will, …and from this limitation alone, and not from the addition of any exernal drive, the concept of obligation arises to extend the maxim of self-love also to the happiness of others.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§8)
     A reaction: This is the heroic and optimistic part of Kant's philosophy, the attempt to derive altruism from pure reason. The claim seems to be that maxims don't motivate until they have been universalised. I fear that only altruism could add such motivation.
You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: Hegel attacks doctrines which are attempts by the individual to supply his own morality, and at one and the same time, to claim for it a genuine universality.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.15
     A reaction: Hegel clearly has Kant in mind. It is a penetrating criticism. Of course, there is no reason why a universal mathematical proof shouldn't be 'provided' by the individual. The Kantian seeks agreement. See Contractualism.
When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Freedom as the definition of man does not depend on others, but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Existentialism and Humanism [1945], p.306), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Anything'
     A reaction: Appears to be a highly Kantian sense of rational duty, and a rather odd constraint on someone whose only value is freedom. Sartre is aware that he needs an existential politics, but he's not there yet. 'Involvement' is an interesting addition to Kant.
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
     Full Idea: To make moral judgements is implicitly to invoke some principle, however specific.
     From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.458)
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If the goodness of the world were to consist in people's fulfilling their obligations, it would by no means follow that one of my obligations was to bring it about that other people kept their obligations
     From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2)
     A reaction: If the maxim of my action is 'ensure that everyone does their duty', presumably that can be universalised. Nelson thought so. It just sounds like a hideous world of self-righteous interference.
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: How can an 'I' that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life that respects its own interests?
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: Not a big problem. Thought constantly flips between objective and subjective, as Nagel has shown us. Compare Nagel in Idea 6446.
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Why should I think of myself as a legislator and at the same time a citizen of a republic governed by some notional laws?
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: Kant's answer is supposed to be 'because you are rational, and hence must want consistency'. If we were all rational, Kant would be right.
Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
     Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion?
     From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10
     A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution?
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
     Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2)
     A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams.
The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
     Full Idea: I believe the general form of moral reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §9)
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realisation of what is best 'sub specie aeternitatis'.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.204)
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
     Full Idea: If we can make judgements about how we should live even after stepping outside of ourselves, they will provide the material for moral theory.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1)
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
     Full Idea: One should occupy a position far enough outside your own life to reduce the importance of the difference between yourself and other people, yet not so far outside that all human values vanish in a nihilistic blackout (i.e.aim for a form of humility).
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2)
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
     Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59)
     A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary.
One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson]
     Full Idea: 'Early to bed and early to rise' is a universalizable maxim, but, though it might be good advice, there is obviously no such obligation.
     From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83)
     A reaction: I take it that Kant's rule won't distinguish moral guidance from prudential guidance. Unfair, I think. I may be a lark, but when I universalise this maxim I see that it can't be willed as a universal rule, because we should tolerate the owls.