604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
4835 | Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza] |
8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
19708 | Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid] |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |