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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

[general issues about external justification]

20 ideas
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Rorty]
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification [Kornblith]
Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A]
Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]