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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties

[what we should take a property to be]

32 ideas
There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Macdonald on Aristotle]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Frede,M on Aristotle]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Koslicki on Aristotle]
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Smith,P on Frege]
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Heil on Armstrong]
All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Lewis on Armstrong]
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker on Shoemaker]
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley]
Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]