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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity

[criticisms the Self as continuity of consciousness]

12 ideas
Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant]
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]