5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
7956 | If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
7957 | Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
18436 | Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |