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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

[existence of non-actual possible worlds]

31 ideas
The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz]
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz ,by Stewart,M]
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz ,by Harré]
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz ,by Rumfitt]
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro]
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]