| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that only one coherent body of beliefs is possible. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this possibility would not be accepted for the ultimate ideal body of beliefs, but it seems undeniable that limited humanity will be stuck with several coherent possibilities. Coherence, though, is within our grasp, unlike correspondence. |
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If the law of contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: Russell is in error in treating coherence as if it was merely non-contradiction. If I see you as four feet tall today and six feet tall tomorrow, that is incoherent (to me) but not an actual contradiction. All accounts of truth need presuppositions. |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Coherence cannot be accepted as the meaning of truth, though it is often a most important test of truth after a certain amount of truth has become known. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: The coherence theory is in fact a confusion of epistemology and ontology. Compare Idea 1364, where Reid charges Locke with confusing the test for personal identity with the thing itself. I wonder if refusal to accept essences causes this problem? |
| 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: No matter how tight our account of coherence we have to admit that there may be more than one set of coherent propositions (as Russell pointed out (1907)). | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2) |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: If 'snow falls from the sky' is true iff it coheres with other beliefs, this is a form of idealism; snow could surely fall from sky even if there were no beliefs in the world to cohere with each other. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: The coherence theory of truth strikes me as yet another blunder involving a confusion of ontology and epistemology. Of course, idealism may be true, but I have yet to hear a good reason why I should abandon commonsense realism. |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| Full Idea: Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding to it one or more false beliefs. | |
| From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.3) | |
| A reaction: A simple but rather devastating point. It is the policeman manufacturing a bogus piece of evidence to clinch the conviction, the scientist faking a single observation to fill in the last corner of a promising theory. |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| Full Idea: The coherence theory seems too liberal. It seems there can be more than one systematic whole which, while being internally coherent, contradict each other, and thus cannot all be true. Coherence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth. | |
| From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a modern post-Tarski axiomatic truth theorist making very short work indeed of the coherence theory of truth. I take Horsten to be correct. |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: The two main objections to the coherence theory of truth are that there is no way to identify the 'specified set' of propositions without contradiction, ...and that some propositions are true which cohere with no set of beliefs. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1/2) | |
| A reaction: The point of the first is that you need a prior knowledge of truth to say which of two sets is the better one. The second one is thinking of long-lost tiny details from the past, which seem to be true without evidence. A huge set might beat the first one. |