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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

[categories of item connected by causation]

35 ideas
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume ,by Davidson]
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant]
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine ,by Schaffer,J]
Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe ,by Schaffer,J]
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon ,by Psillos]
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson ,by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson ,by Maslin]
Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor ,by Psillos]
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau]
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau]
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]