structure for 'Knowledge Sources'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism

[knowledge is essentially derived from experience]

38 ideas
1820 The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20
20805 All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: In general one can find nothing in our conceptions that is not known to oneself in direct experience. For it is grasped either by similarity to what is revealed in direct experience, or by expansion or reduction or compounding.
     From: report of Stoic school (fragments/reports [c.200 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 8.58
     A reaction: Although the stoics allow for purely a priori knowledge, this quotation sounds comprehensively empirical.
12121 We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
     Full Idea: They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.5)
     A reaction: Just the sort of pithy remark for which Bacon is famous. It is an obvious point, but a nice corrective to anyone who wants to apply empirical principles in a rather gormless way.
3648 Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Empiricists are like ants; they collect and put to use; but rationalists, like spiders, spin threads out of themselves. (…and bees follow the middle way, of collecting material and transforming it).
     From: Francis Bacon (Cogitata et Visa [1607])
     A reaction: Nice (and so concisely expressed). Bees seem to be just more intelligent and energetic empiricists.
16688 Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: All evidence is conception, as it is said, and all conception is imagination and proceeds from sense. And spirits we suppose to be those substances which work not upon the sense, and therefore not conceptible.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.11.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2
     A reaction: This is exactly the same as Hume's claim that all ideas are the result of impressions, and is the very essence of empiricism. We see here that such an epistemology can have huge consequences.
7405 Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Experience concludeth nothing universally.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.4.10), quoted by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2
     A reaction: Empiricists seem proud to claim this limitation on human understanding, where rationalists like Leibniz use it as an argument against empiricism. Kripke says (e.g. Idea 4966) they are both wrong! I sympathise with Kripke.
7724 All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke]
     Full Idea: Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.01.02)
     A reaction: In the face of Kant's wonderfully rich account of the mind, this simple empiricism seems to be horribly naïve, but it could be defended by saying that all the other paraphernalia of the mind (associations, categories etc) are not in any way ideas.
19431 There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It can be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which understands.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: Given that Leibniz is labelled as a 'rationalist', this is awfully close to empiricism. Not Locke's 'tabula rasa' perhaps, but Hume's experiences plus associations. Leibniz has a much loftier notion of understanding and reason than Hume does.
3953 Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: The difference between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream, is that the latter are faint and indistinct.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.225)
     A reaction: In Hume this becomes 'impressions' and 'ideas'. It does raise the question of WHY some ideas are not as faint as others.
6720 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: The objects of knowledge are either ideas imprinted on the senses, or passions and operations of the mind, or ideas (formed by memory and imagination) compounding, dividing or barely representing the original perceptions.
     From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §1)
     A reaction: This is the germ of Hume's 'associations' (Idea 2189). There is not much room here for synthetic a priori knowledge, as the a priori part seems to merely know the mind. Most of Russell's epistemology is contained in the last part of the sentence.
2182 Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume]
     Full Idea: 'Impressions' are our more lively perceptions, when we hear, see, feel, love, hate, desire or will. 'Ideas' are less lively perceptions, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.12)
23631 Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume]
     Full Idea: When Hume divides all perceptions into two classes or species, distinguished by their degrees of force and vivacity, this is loose and unphilosophical. To differ in species is one thing, to differ in degree is another.
     From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.12) by Thomas Reid - Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary 1
     A reaction: This is Hume's 'impressions' and 'ideas'. As usual with Reid, this is a very astute criticism. Reid is a direct realist, so his solution is to view ideas as weakened impressions. If impressions are strong ideas, you get idealism (which is bad!).
2184 All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume]
     Full Idea: All our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.13)
2190 All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume]
     Full Idea: All objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.20)
2192 All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume]
     Full Idea: All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond of our memory and senses.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.22)
2246 If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume]
     Full Idea: If we take in hand any volume of divinity or metaphysics, ask 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Or experimental reason on matters of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], XII.III.132)
21309 A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
     Full Idea: No proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions.
     From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix)
     A reaction: An interesting variant on expressions of the empiricist principle. Presumably one can say intelligible things about Escher drawings.
15619 Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Empiricism resulted from a need for concrete content, as opposed to abstract theories that cannot advance from universal generalizations to the particular, and for a firm hold against the possibility of proving any claim at all in the field.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §37)
     A reaction: That sounds about right, and makes you wonder why Hegel wasn't an empiricist.
15620 Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel]
     Full Idea: We must recognise the important principle of freedom that lies in Empiricism; namely, that what ought to count in our human knowing, we ought to see for ourselves, and to know ourselves as present in it.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §38 Rem)
     A reaction: Like Idea 15619, this is an interesting and perceptive remark, from a philosopher who seems a long way from empiricism. I presume he will be thinking mainly of Hume, via Kant. Personally I prefer Locke.
14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
     Full Idea: If Mill says that experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, he asks what cannot be granted.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898])
     A reaction: Notice from Idea 14785 that Peirce has ideas in mind, and not just inner experiences like hunger. Empiricism certainly begins to look more plausible if we expand the notion of experience. It must include what we learned from prior experience.
16476 For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
     Full Idea: So long as a man avoids words which are condensed inductions (such as 'dog'), and confines himself to words that can describe a single experience, it is possible for a single experience to show that his words are true.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: One might question whether a line can be drawn between the inductive and the non-inductive in this way. I'm inclined just to say that the simpler the proposition the less room there is for error in confirming it.
7290 If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
     Full Idea: If Russell rejects innate ideas, and he even thinks the laws of thought must by triggered by experiences (e.g. of a beech tree), and he doesn't embrace associations, this implies that he thinks the mind begins as a tabula rasa.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by George Thompson - talk
     A reaction: This nice observation places Russell as (in my view) a rather old-fashioned empiricist, who ignores Hume and Kant, and is not willing to speculate about how the mind can turn acquaintances with sense-data into knowledge
5357 It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
     Full Idea: In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: Is experience the 'natural' place to begin? It didn't seem to strike Descartes that way. It seems better to say that philosophy begins when we are not quite satisfied with experience, and the natural place to begin is 'dissatisfaction'.
5382 We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
     Full Idea: We have acquaintance with outer senses, with inner sense (by introspection), with memory (of outer or inner sensations), with a Self (probably), and also with universals (general ideas).
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: The spectacular odd one out in a basic empiricist theory is, of course, universals, when one expects some sort of nominalist reduction of those into sense-data. I am very sympathetic to the Russell line, though it spells big ontological trouble.
5389 Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
     Full Idea: The chief importance of knowledge by descriptions is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: The most basic question for empiricism concerns how we can know things beyond immediate experience. Russell is right, though this doesn't tell us much. We need to know the rules for valid descriptions, explanation, speculations etc.
13932 Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
     Full Idea: Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions etc. They usually feel more sympathy with nominalists than with realists (in the medieval sense).
     From: Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 1)
     A reaction: The obvious reason is that you can't have sense experiences of abstract entities. I like the question 'what are they made of?' rather than the question 'how can I experience them?'.
4729 Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer]
     Full Idea: Ayer's gives an account of the a priori (as analytic) that readily meshes with empiricism, and empiricism had long been lacking an adequate account of the a priori
     From: comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4
     A reaction: Ayer's logical positivist view was based on Hume's 'relations of ideas', as opposed to 'matters of fact'. Personally I see no reason why some facts about reality shouldn't be self-evident to thought, just as others are self-evident to the senses.
5180 All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer]
     Full Idea: One way to attack a metaphysician would be to enquire from what premises his propositions were deduced. Must he not begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses?
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This simple idea is the core of empiricism. This is a heavily criticised doctrine, but you must start somewhere. Hume and Russell agreed. Don't forget, though, that Descartes's first move is to reject the senses as untrustworthy.
5169 My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The empiricist doctrine to which we are committed is a logical doctrine concerning the distinction between analytic propositions, synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This is the tough logical positivist version of empiricism. The whole project stumbles on the relationship between a synthetic proposition and its verifying experiences. How close? What of wild speculations? The analytic part is interesting, though.
19046 Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine]
     Full Idea: Since 1750 empiricism shows five turns for the better. First was a shift from ideas to words. Second a shift from terms to sentences. Third the shift to systems of sentences. Fourth the abandonment of analytic-synthetic dualism. Fifth was naturalism.
     From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.67)
     A reaction: [compressed] Quine must be largely credited with the last two. The first four are almost entirely linguistic in character, which is characteristic of mid-twentieth-century empiricism. I would offer the recognition of explanation as central for the sixth.
19049 In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine]
     Full Idea: We have come to recognise that in a scientific theory even a whole sentence is ordinarily too short a text to serve as an independent vehicle of empirical meaning.
     From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.70)
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
     Full Idea: One dogma of empiricism is that there is some fundamental cleavage between truths that are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of facts, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact.
     From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.20)
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
     Full Idea: The outer edge of our empirical system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its elaborate myths and fictions, has as its objective the simplicity of laws.
     From: Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953], p.45)
8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
     Full Idea: Traditional empiricism takes impressions, ideas or sense data as the basic unit of empirical thought, but Quine takes account of the theoretical as well as the observational; the unit of empirical significance is whole systems of belief.
     From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.1
     A reaction: This invites either the question of what components make up the whole systems, or (alternatively) what sort of mental events decide to accept a system as a whole. Should Quine revert either to traditional empiricism, or to rationalism?
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
     Full Idea: Davidson thinks that experience can be nothing but an extra-conceptual impact on sensibility. So he concludes that experience must be outside the space of reasons.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], I.6) by John McDowell - Mind and World I
     A reaction: McDowell's challenge to the view that experience is extra-conceptual seems to be the key debate among modern empiricists. My only intuition in this area is that we should beware of all-or-nothing solutions to such problems.
8253 Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell]
     Full Idea: The world's impressions on our senses are already possessed of conceptual content.
     From: John McDowell (Mind and World [1994], I.6)
     A reaction: This is a key idea of McDowell's, which challenges most traditional empiricist views, and (maybe) offers a solution to the rationalist/empiricist debate. His commitment to the 'space of reasons' strikes me as an optional extra.
2961 Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Empiricism is not just a theory of knowledge; it is also a theory meaning.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.149)
3172 Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey]
     Full Idea: Two of the key claims of empiricism are that all knowledge must be justified on the basis of experience, and that all knowledge in fact originates in experience.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3)