5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously
[Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d
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A reaction:
This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth).
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5938
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Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is
[Ross]
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Full Idea:
The acquisition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, while the attainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty; this surely points to an infinity superiority of virtue over pleasure.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
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A reaction:
You have to be a fully paid-up intuitionist (like Ross) before you can assert such gloriously confident judgements about duty. Personal pleasure could become a duty if you had mistakenly denied it to yourself for a long time.
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5121
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Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it
[Harman]
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Full Idea:
Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing.
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From:
Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2)
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A reaction:
This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing.
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