structure for 'Metaethics'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue

[goodness is is excellent of character and behaviour]

6 ideas
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'What will be gained by a man who is good?' 'That is easy - he will be happy'.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 205a)
     A reaction: Suppose you tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (a good deed), but failed. Happiness presumably results from success, rather than mere good intentions.
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d
     A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth).
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A well-constituted human being, a 'happy one', must perform certain actions and shrink from other actions. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.2)
     A reaction: A nice reversal of basic Aristotle, though Aristotle does say that the truly virtuous person is happy in their actions. Treat unhappy people with caution!
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
     Full Idea: The acquisition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, while the attainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty; this surely points to an infinity superiority of virtue over pleasure.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
     A reaction: You have to be a fully paid-up intuitionist (like Ross) before you can assert such gloriously confident judgements about duty. Personal pleasure could become a duty if you had mistakenly denied it to yourself for a long time.
Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman]
     Full Idea: Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2)
     A reaction: This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing.
Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life).
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong.