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Single Idea 21596

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness]

Full Idea

Logic requires expressions to have the same referents wherever they occur; vague natural languages violate this contraint.

Gist of Idea

Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic


Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 2.2)

A Reaction

This doesn't mean that logic has to win. Maybe it is important for philosophers who see logic as central to be always aware of vagueness as the gulf between their precision and the mess of reality. Precision is worth trying for, though.

Book Reference

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.44

Related Ideas

Idea 21597 Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]

Idea 21602 Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson]