return to list of latest ideas

Single Idea 21617

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as semantic]

Full Idea

A philosopher might endorse bivalence for propositions, while treating vagueness as the failure of an utterance to express a unique proposition.

Gist of Idea

We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition

Source

Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.2)

A Reaction

This idea jumps at out me as an extremely promising approach to vagueness, because I am a fan of propositions (and have written a paper on them). The whole point of propositions is that they are not ambiguous (and probably not vague).

Book Reference

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.187

Related Idea

Idea 9133 Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]